Despite the documented importance of transport costs for¯rms with sales in geographically separated markets, theoretical analyses typically ignore such costs. This paper analyzes the e®ects of transport costs for a risk averse, competitive¯rm selling a single good in a domestic (certain) and a foreign (uncertain) market, and shows that these e®ects are asymmetric. The e®ects on total output and the inter-market allocation of output depend on the behavior of marginal domestic transport costs, but are largely independent of the form of the foreign transport cost function. Moreover, regardless of the latter, if marginal transport costs in the domestic market are constant, the¯rm's total output is independent of its attitude towards risk and the parameters of the risky market. This suggests that the¯rm's activity can be insulated from foreign uncertainties by government policies that focus on the shape of the domestic transportation cost function.
Introduction
The impact of price uncertainty on the output decisions of multi-market¯rms has been analyzed under a variety of di®erent scenarios. For example, Katz, Paroush and Kahana (1982) consider an exporting¯rm which faces price uncertainty in its export market while domestic prices are certain; Satyanarayan (1999) and Dalal and Raju (2003) assume that prices in both the export and domestic markets are uncertain; Viane and Zilcha (1998) introduce multiple sources of uncertainty in a model of an exporting¯rm that can transact in forward exchange markets as well as in a domestic commodity futures markets. All of these models assume the absence of transportation costs. 1 Yet, for geographically separated markets such costs are typically quite signi¯cant. Indeed, Frankel et al. (1996) estimate that, for intercontinental trade, transport costs average about 16% of the value of the good shipped, and Hummels (1998) concludes that transportation costs`play a central role in allocating bilateral trade', and that they are comparable in magnitude to tari® rates.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of transportation costs on the output and allocation decisions of a¯rm which sells its product both domestically and abroad. We assume that the foreign price is uncertain while there is no uncertainty in the domestic market, and compare the implications of our model with the zero transport cost model. We¯nd that the di®erences between the two models are substantial, and, moreover, that transport costs have asymmetric e®ects on the two markets. For instance, if transport costs in the domestic market are zero, then positive transport costs in the risky (foreign) market a®ect the allocation of output between markets but do not a®ect the optimal total output. The latter is, however, reduced by positive transport costs in the certain (domestic) market regardless of whether transport costs in the foreign market are positive or zero. We relate this¯nding to the well-known`separation' result which holds for a risk averse, multi-market¯rm that sells a single good in several competitive markets, if the price in one of these markets is certain. According to this result, the¯rm's total output is determined without reference to the parameters of the uncertain market or the¯rm's attitude towards risk, 2 so that while foreign parameters might alter the allocation of output between markets, they do not a®ect the overall level of activity of a¯rm.
We show that the separation result survives the introduction of (any form of) transportation costs into the uncertain market(s) and of linear transportation costs into the certain market. The separation fails, however, upon the introduction of non-linear transportation costs into the certain market. Thus, the shape of the transportation cost function in the domestic (certain) economy determines whether the overall level of activity of a¯rm is a®ected by foreign parameters.
This¯nding carries with it some potentially interesting policy implications, since it means that it is possible for the¯rm's output to depend solely on domestic parameters, even when transportation costs are allowed for. Governments can therefore in°uence the level of activity of a¯rm that sells both at home and abroad without reference to foreign conditions. Moreover, the government can insulate a¯rm's output from foreign variables by appropriately choosing the domestic transportation cost function facing the¯rm.
The model without transport costs
Consider a¯rm that produces a single product that it sells both domestically (market 1) and abroad (market 2). Total output is Q = q 1 + q 2 ; where q 1 is the amount sold in market 1 and q 2 is sold in market 2. The price in market 1, p 1 ; is assumed to be known with certainty. However, the price in market 2 is a random variable denoted byp 2 : At this stage we place no further restrictions onp 2 ; in particular we do not specify the precise manner (e.g. additive or multiplicative) in which uncertainty enters the speci¯cation for the price in the uncertain market. The production cost function is C (Q) + K; where K is a¯xed cost, and we assume that C Q´@ C=@Q > 0;
3 The¯rm is risk averse and seeks to maximize the expected utility of pro¯ts.
If transport costs are absent, then, as mentioned above, the total output of the¯rm is determined solely by price in the certain market provided that the¯rm sells some output in that market (see Holthausen, 1979; Katz and Paroush, 1979) . Denoting the¯rm's utility function by U (¼); where ¼ is pro¯t, the¯rm seeks to solve the problem max
Assuming a regular, interior solution yields the¯rst order conditions
Equation (1) states that the¯rm determines its total output by setting the marginal cost of output equal to the price in the certain market. Thus, while the allocation of output between markets (i.e. the magnitudes of q 1 and q 2 ) depends on the parameters of both markets and on the¯rm's attitude towards risk, total output (Q) is determined without reference to the uncertain market, or to the¯rm's attitude towards risk. This powerful`separation' result simpli¯es the analysis of a competitive¯rm selling in many markets. As long as the price in a single market is certain, thē rm's output decision is independent of the way it allocates output among di®erent markets.
Before proceeding, it may be useful to explain the intuition behind this result. While the result is well-known, a discussion of the economic rationale for it has not been presented. Moreover, an understanding of this result in the context of the basic model used in this section facilitates a better understanding of the intuition behind the more general model presented later in this paper.
First suppose that a¯rm sells its output only in the domestic market at a certain price, p 1 :
In order to maximize its pro¯ts, the¯rm sets p 1 = C Q (Q) : Now allow the¯rm to sell part of its output abroad, where price is uncertain. If, when sales in the foreign market are zero, the expected marginal utility from sales in this market exceeds that from domestic sales, the¯rm will divert some of its output from its domestic to its foreign market. So long as it maintains some sales in its domestic market, the¯rm will continue to equate p 1 with the marginal cost of output in that market. However, for a¯rm producing a single output in a single production facility, the marginal cost of output sold in the domestic market is the same as the marginal cost of total output. Hence, if it increases output in order to make foreign sales, it loses money at the margin on domestic sales. Q is determined only by the parameters of the foreign market. However, as long as q 2 < Q; total output is determined solely by domestic market parameters.
It is worth emphasizing that a crucial requirement for the separation result to hold is that the marginal cost of output sold in market 1 depend only on total output and not on the division of output between the markets. This is the case in the simple model discussed above, in which production costs are the only source of costs. However, as soon as market-speci¯c costs|such as transportation costs|are included, it becomes possible for the marginal costs of output sold in one market to depend on both total output and on the division of output between markets. Once this happens, the separation result will not hold.
Including transport costs
There is ample evidence to indicate that transport costs for both domestic and international trade are quite signi¯cant. For international trade, some evidence provided by Frankel et al. (1996) and Hummels (1998) has already been cited in section 1. In addition, Limão and Venables (2001) assert that as trade liberalization reduces or removes arti¯cial barriers to trade`the e®ective rate of protection provided by transport costs is now, in many cases, considerably higher than that provided by tari®s'. They conclude that transport costs have a substantial impact on trade°ows, with a doubling of transport costs from their median value reducing trade volumes by 45%. Evidence on the importance of transport costs for domestic trade is provided by Edwards (1970) , who, in a study of the U.K. economy, concludes that on the average`it is probable that transport accounts for at least 9 percent of the total cost of producing and distributing'. 4 Within the U.S., transport costs as a percentage of the value of output for broad sectoral aggregates range from in excess of 7%
for agriculture and construction to between 3% and 5% for manufacturing, mining and wholesale and retail trade (see U.S. Department of Transportation, 2001). For developing countries these percentages are likely to be much higher (see for instance the analysis of Milner et al., 1998) .
Given the quantitative importance of transport costs, it makes sense to include them in the model, and the appropriate form of the transport cost functions must be investigated. In practice, the determination of freight rates is an extremely complicated matter, with rates varying according to type of commodity, distance and quantity (see Wood and Johnson, 1996; Norton, 1971 ).
The classi¯cation according to commodity type is complex and depends on a number of factors including (but not limited to) whether the good is bulky, fragile, perishable, high-value, etc. Total transportation charges are, of course, an increasing (usually concave) function of distance, and depend, in addition, on quantity. Other things remaining unchanged, per unit transportation costs usually decrease with the quantity of the good shipped. 5 In addition, rates also vary according to the mode of shipment (road, rail, water, or air). 6 To further complicate the issue, a good may 4 This¯gure does, of course, vary considerably among commodities, ranging from 40% in stone and slate quarrying to 1.08 % in watches.
5 This is most likely to be the case for those transportation modes characterized by high¯xed costs. These include railroads (see Levin, 1981; Wood and Johnson, 1996) , and ocean liner shipping (see Davies, 1983; Fink et al. 2002) . However, Davies (1983) also reports that at high levels of capacity utilisation, average variable costs may rise for break-bulk, though not for container, shipping. In contrast to railroads and ocean liners, truckers'¯xed costs are very low (see Wood and Johnson, 1996, p. 101 )`when one considers that an individual can lease the truck, lease the drivers and operate out of a pay telephone'. In an empirical study of Australian and U.S. airlines, Kirby (1986) found`substantial economies of operation with respect to load factors, aircraft size and stage length'.
6 The relative cost of rail shipments tends to lie between road and water shipments (see Healey and Ilbery, 1990) .
be shipped using several di®erent modes of transportation, and the rates charged to users may be a®ected by government regulations and the presence of market imperfections. 7 Nonetheless, there is compelling evidence to suggest that per unit transport costs decrease (or at least do not increase)
as the quantity of the good shipped increases, ceteris paribus. In fact, in a seven-country study Hummels (1998) found that even when all modes of transport are taken into account, costs per kilogram are a decreasing function of weight.
Of the three major determinants of transport costs|type of commodity, distance, and quantity| the¯rst two are held constant in our model. Thus, our speci¯cation focuses on capturing the variation in transport costs that can be attributed to variations in quantity. The transport cost functions should capture the existence of¯xed costs that are independent of the volume of goods being shipped (e.g. costs of paperwork, insurance, communications, minimum charges imposed by the shipper. etc.) and should also model the phenomenon (discussed above) of non-increasing per unit costs.
Apart from satisfying these restrictions, the transport cost functions we adopt are extremely general. Speci¯cally, for market 1 we assume that transport costs are given by
where ± 1 > 0 is a¯xed cost, ® is a positive shift parameter, and f (q 1 ) models the dependence While air freight charges tend to be higher, the nature of the goods usually shipped by air (fragile, perishable, high value per kg., etc.) is su±ciently di®erent from the character of the goods shipped by other modes that any simple comparison of rates is likely to be misleading. 7 For instance, ocean liner shipping is dominated by the presence of cartel-like associations called liner conferences, which engage in exclusive dealing contracts and price discrimination. See Yong (1996) for a discussion.
of transport costs on the quantity of goods shipped.
8 The function is de¯ned for a given distance from the point of production to the domestic market. We assume f (0) = 0 and f 0 (q 1 ) > 0; but we place no restrictions on the sign of f 00 (q 1 ) : As sales in market 1 increase, per unit transport costs fall continuously if f 00 (q 1 ) = 0 (i.e. f (q 1 ) is linear and marginal transport costs are constant)
or if f 00 (q 1 ) < 0 (i.e. f (q 1 ) is strictly concave and marginal transport costs are decreasing). If f 00 (q 1 ) > 0 (so that f (q 1 ) is strictly convex and marginal transport costs are increasing) then per unit transport costs fall initially, but eventually increase, giving rise to a U-shaped average transportation cost curve.
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Similarly, making obvious changes in the notation, transport costs in the market for q 2 are given by t 2 (q 2 ) = ± 2 +¯g (q 2 ) :
While the general properties of this function are the same as those of t 1 (q 1 ) ; in general, t 1 (q 1 ) 6 = t 2 (q 2 ) : This is because the distance to the two markets di®ers and, in addition, shipping to the different markets may require di®erent combinations of transportation modes. For example, shipping domestically may require a combination of rail and road only, while shipping abroad may require 8 The¯xed components of the transport cost functions are positive for any positive level of the good shipped. If a good is not sold in a particular market then total transport costs in that market, including the¯xed component, are zero. However, in the present model, we assume that positive amounts are sold in both markets.
9 If ±1 = 0; then per unit transport costs for q1 will stay constant, fall, or rise, as sales increase, if f (q1) is linear, strictly concave, or strictly convex, respectively. These variations in the basic model can easily be handled, and do not lead to any signi¯cant di®erences in the results of the analysis. Note also that the present formulation is su±ciently general to permit, as a special case, the existence of`iceberg' transport costs (in which part of the good`melts' as it is transported), which are a feature of the new economic geography. Iceberg transport costs would be modeled by setting ±1 = 0; ® = 1 and f (q1) = tq1; t < 1 (see Neary, 2001; Kilkenny, 1998) .
water transportation as well.
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The inclusion of transport costs alters the¯rm's optimization problem to max q1;q2
where total¯xed costs, associated with production and transportation are given by B = K +± 1 +± 2 :
The¯rst-order conditions for a regular, interior solution, now become
and the second order conditions require
10 However, in general, none of our results would be a®ected if the two transport cost functions were identical.
The second order conditions will clearly be satis¯ed if f
00¸0
; g
; i.e., for constant or increasing marginal transportation costs. However, this restriction is su±cient but not necessary; and it is possible for the second order conditions to hold even if marginal transport costs are a decreasing functions of sales. Note that H q 1 q 1 < 0 requires that C QQ + ®f 00 (q 1 ) > 0: This clearly holds if f 00¸0 : If f 00 < 0; it requires that marginal production costs be increasing faster than marginal transport costs in the certain market are decreasing.
Condition (3) allows us to compare total output in the presence of transportation costs with the zero transport cost case.
Proposition 1 If transportation costs in the domestic market are positive then total output will be lower than if they are zero. This result is independent of the existence or non-existence of transportation costs in the foreign market.
Corollary Even if there exist transportation costs in the foreign market, total output will be the same as when such costs do not exist, so long as transportation costs in the domestic market are zero.
Proof Let total output in the absence of transport costs in the domestic market be given by Q 0 :
Note that the di®erence between C Q (Q 0 ) and C Q (Q) depends only on the domestic transport cost function so that the result is independent of the properties (or the existence of) foreign transport costs. The proof of the corollary follows immediately. ¤
The intuition for this result hinges on the fact (discussed earlier) that, if the¯rm sells in both markets, it determines total output by equating domestic price with the marginal cost of a domestic sale. However, the cost of a domestic sale is the sum of production costs and domestic transportation costs, and the inclusion of the latter shifts the entire marginal cost curve upwards (leftwards). Hence, in the presence of positive marginal domestic transportation costs the¯rm will produce less than in their absence. And, if it incurs no domestic transportation costs the¯rm simply continues to equate domestic price with the marginal production cost of output, regardless of transport costs in the foreign market.
Another di®erence between the zero transport cost and the positive transport cost models lies in the relationship between the expected foreign price and the domestic price. It is easy to show that in the absence of transport costs a necessary condition for sales in both markets to be positive is that the expected foreign price be greater than the domestic price. In the presence of transport costs this condition must be modi¯ed as indicated in the Proposition below.
Proposition 2 When there are positive transportation costs in both markets, a necessary condition for sales in both markets to be positive is that marginal expected pro¯ts in the foreign market exceed marginal pro¯ts in the domestic market.
Proof Let E [p 2 ] be denoted by ¹ p 2 : Then (4) can be rewritten as
where the left hand side of (5) is marginal expected pro¯ts in the foreign market, and the inequality holds since Cov (U 0 (¼) ;p 2 ) < 0. Since the left hand side of (3) is marginal pro¯ts in the domestic market, the desired result is immediate. ¤ This result follows directly from the¯rm's aversion to risk. Since pro¯ts on foreign sales are uncertain, the weight the¯rm attaches to an expected marginal dollar of foreign pro¯t is smaller than the weight attached to a marginal dollar of domestic pro¯t. However, because of possible di®erences in the structure of foreign and domestic transport costs, this does not necessarily mean that to ensure positive sales in both markets the expected price in the foreign market must exceed the price in the domestic market. Thus, (5) and (3) imply
and (6) implies that, unlike the zero transport cost case, positive sales in both markets are possible if ¹ p 2 < p 1 : A necessary (though not su±cient condition) for this is that marginal transport costs in the domestic market be greater than those in the foreign market.
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The next Proposition addresses the question of whether the separation result discussed in section 2 survives the introduction of transportation costs.
Proposition 3 If marginal transport costs in the domestic market are constant, then the separation result holds: optimal total output is independent of the distribution of the uncertain price, of 11 Note that even this result does not depend on the assumption that the two transport cost functions are di®erent. Even if ®´¯and the f and g functions are identical, the¯rst two terms on the right hand side of (6) will not reduce to zero unless they are evaluated at the same point, i.e., unless output is equally divided between the two markets and q1 = q2: transport costs in the foreign market, and of the¯rm's utility function.
Proof If marginal transport costs in the certain market are constant, then f is linear, so that f 0 (q 1 ) is constant and Q is determined from (3) only, by the equation p 1 = C Q (Q)+® (constant) ; yielding Q as a function of p 1 and ®: ¤ Thus, in the situation speci¯ed in Proposition 3, total output is independent not only of the distribution of prices in the risky market but also of transport costs in that market. As explained earlier, a crucial requirement for the separation result to hold is that marginal costs in the certain market be independent of the distribution of output between markets. In this case, domestic marginal costs are the sum of marginal production and marginal transport costs. The former always depend only on total output, and (although total domestic transport costs will depend on domestic sales) if domestic marginal transport costs are constant, they will be independent of domestic sales. This is, of course what is guaranteed by linearity of domestic transport costs, and this is the reason the separation result holds. 12 Intuitively, one would expect the absence of such linearity to negate the separation result, and the next Proposition establishes that this is in fact the case.
Proposition 4 If transportation costs in the certain market are non-linear, total output will depend on the parameters of both markets and on the¯rm's utility function.
12 Interestingly, in the standard new economic geography model, a similar result holds for the manufacturing sector (the only sector with positive transport costs) despite the assumption of monopolistic competition. In this model, transport costs in region 1 (which can be interpreted as the domestic sector) are assumed to be zero, and because of a simplifying (constant elasticity) demand assumption, marginal revenue depends only on the domestic output price and the demand elasticity. Firms equate marginal revenue to marginal cost, and output for each¯rm is determined independently of conditions in region 2, including the cost of transporting goods to that region. See Kilkenny (1998) and Neary (2001) for details.
Proof If transportation costs in the certain market are non-linear, then f (q 1 ) is not linear and f 0 (q 1 ) must be a function of q 1 : Hence, Q can only be determined by solving (3) and (4) simultaneously, and Q is no longer separable. ¤
As indicated above, this is the intuitively expected result. Thus, if f (q 1 ) is not linear, total output will depend on the parameters of both markets.
A comparative static analysis will provide some additional insights into the dependence of Q; q 1 ; and q 2 on the parameters of the model. However, before proceeding, we need to specify more precisely the manner in which uncertainty a®ectsp 2 : Uncertainty could enter additively or multiplicatively. Additive uncertainty is modeled bỹ
where E ["] = 0; and µ is a positive shift parameter with an initial value of unity. Multiplicative uncertainty is represented byp
where E [¿] = 0; :and again µ is a positive shift parameter with an initial value of unity. In both cases E [p 2 ] = ¹ p 2 ; and an increase in µ away from unity represents a mean-preserving increase in price uncertainty.
We obtain comparative statics results for the e®ect on q 1 ; q 2 ; and Q of changes in p 1 ; ¹ p 2 , µ; B; ®; and¯for both additive and multiplicative uncertainty. Regardless of how uncertainty is modelled, an increase in µ represents an increase in foreign price uncertainty, and increases in ® and represent, respectively, multiplicative increases in the output-dependent components of domestic and foreign transport costs. Making the standard assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), Table 1 identi¯es the e®ects on q 1 ; q 2 ; and Q of increases in p 1 ; ¹ p 2 ; µ; B; ®; and¯for additive price uncertainty: 13 The results are provided for f 00¸0 and for f 00 < 0:
In most instances, the curvature of the transport cost function in the foreign market is unimportant for signing the results, but this is decidedly not so for the curvature of the transport cost function in the domestic market. For instance, an increase in the expected foreign price unambiguously decreases domestic sales and increases sales abroad. However, if f 00 (q 1 ) = 0; the changes in sales are o®setting, so that total output remains unchanged; if f 00 (q 1 ) > 0 the increase in foreign sales dominates the decrease in domestic sales and total output increases, while the converse is true if f 00 (q 1 ) < 0; so that total output falls. Similar results are obtained for the e®ects of an increase in foreign price uncertainty, an increase in¯xed costs, and a multiplicative increase in foreign transport costs. In all three of these cases domestic sales rise and foreign sales fall, 14 but the e®ect on total sales is determined by the sign of f 00 : Total sales fall, stay constant, or rise, depending on whether f 00 is positive, zero, or negative. Now suppose additive price uncertainty is replaced with multiplicative price uncertainty. As already noted, this does not a®ect the validity of Propositions 1-4 and their corollaries. In fact, the comparative statics results are also largely unaltered. The only entries in Table 1 that are a®ected 13 The derivation of all the comparative statics results (including those for multiplicative uncertainty) is straightforward, and details have therefore not been provided in the paper. However, detailed calculations are available from the authors upon request.
14 For the case of an increase in¯xed costs, weak inequalities hold, as indicated in 
Conclusions
Transportation costs are an important fact of life for both domestic and foreign sales. Yet, these costs are often neglected in theoretical research on the¯rm. In this paper we illustrate the potential importance of these costs in qualifying well accepted results. Speci¯cally, we prove that the well-known separation between output and allocation decisions of a multi-market¯rm facing an uncertain price in one market, may be negated in the presence of transport costs. Moreover, we show that market-speci¯c transport costs may have asymmetric implications for certain and uncertain markets.
This asymmetry generates certain policy implications. Governments are often looked to when rms face uncertainty in foreign markets. This explains, for example, why governments often o®er to guarantee export proceeds to domestic companies. However, the separation result suggests that, at least in terms of the total output of a¯rm selling both at home and abroad, foreign price uncertainty may be irrelevant. As this paper shows, whether this is so depends on the whether the domestic transportation cost function is linear.
Even if such linearity is not present, it may be possible to insulate the¯rm's activity from foreign uncertainties, by adopting policies that focus on the shape of the domestic transportation cost function. In particular, any policy that e®ectively linearizes transports costs associated with domestic sales will have the desired e®ect. One policy might be to impose a system of non-linear quantity related taxes or subsidies (altering f (q 1 )); while¯nancing these taxes or subsidies by imposing a°at tax or subsidy on domestic transportation (altering ± 1 ): Another possibility might be direct regulation of rates in order to create constant marginal costs. Although the current consensus of economic opinion is in favour of deregulation, our analysis suggests that appropriately regulated transport costs may have the hitherto overlooked bene¯t of reducing the impact of foreign uncertainties. Note that the regulation required would be feasible in that it does not require any modi¯cation of foreign transport costs, which are likely to be outside the direct control of the domestic government.
Over and above our speci¯c¯ndings, however, the message of this paper is that transportation costs may play an important role in, and have signi¯cant implications for, the theory of the¯rm.
As we have shown, the inclusion of transport costs in theoretical models can potentially in°uence, and even reverse, well accepted results.
